International Journal of Emerging Trends in Computer Science and Information Technology
ISSN: 3050-9246 | https://doi.org/10.63282/3050-9246.IJETCSIT-V7I2P130
Eureka Vision Publication | Volume 7, Issue 2, 227-245, 2026

Original Article

Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness: Cybersecurity Strategies for the Quantum Computing Era

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Received On: 21/03/2026 ***Revised On: 20/04/2026*** ***Accepted On: 27/04/2026*** ***Published On: 04/05/2026***

Abstract - *Quantum computing is no longer a distant concern for cybersecurity planning. Its progress has raised serious questions about the long-term reliability of widely used public-key cryptographic systems, especially RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, and related key exchange mechanisms that currently protect digital communication, cloud services, financial transactions, government systems, and enterprise information assets. The main concern is that powerful quantum algorithms could weaken the mathematical assumptions on which these systems depend, creating future risks for encrypted data, digital signatures, identity systems, and secure network protocols (Shor, 1994; Mosca, 2018). Post-quantum cryptography has therefore become a major cybersecurity readiness priority, not only as a technical replacement for vulnerable algorithms, but as a broader organizational migration challenge. Effective preparation requires cryptographic asset inventory, risk classification, crypto-agility, vendor coordination, interoperability testing, and phased deployment across complex information systems (Kumar, 2022; Campbell, 2025). This article examines the cybersecurity implications of quantum computing and reviews the major post-quantum cryptographic algorithm families, current standardization efforts, enterprise migration barriers, and strategic readiness measures needed for the quantum computing era. It also discusses the importance of aligning post-quantum migration with existing cybersecurity governance, information systems management, and long-term digital resilience planning. By emphasizing early preparation, structured migration, and continuous cryptographic governance, the article argues that organizations can reduce future quantum-related exposure and strengthen the security of critical digital infrastructure before large-scale quantum attacks become practical (NIST, 2024; NCCoE, 2025).*

Keywords - *Post-Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Computing, Cybersecurity Readiness, Crypto-Agility, Cryptographic Migration, Quantum-Safe Security, NIST Standards, Information Systems Security.*

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of Quantum Computing and Cybersecurity Risk

Quantum computing is becoming one of the most important technological developments affecting the future of cybersecurity. Unlike classical computers, which process information in binary form, quantum computers use quantum bits that can represent more complex computational states. This gives quantum computing the potential to solve certain mathematical problems much faster than conventional computing systems. In fields such as drug discovery, optimization, materials science, finance, and artificial intelligence, this capability may support major scientific and industrial progress. However, the same computational power also creates a serious concern for cybersecurity because many existing security systems depend on mathematical problems that are difficult for classical computers to solve but may become vulnerable to quantum algorithms.

Modern digital security depends heavily on cryptographic systems. Public-key cryptography is used to protect online banking, digital signatures, cloud communication, identity management, software updates, virtual private networks, government databases, healthcare systems, and enterprise information systems. These systems help ensure confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and trust in digital environments. If the cryptographic foundations behind these systems are weakened, the effect would not be limited to one organization or one sector. It could affect the broader digital infrastructure that supports financial services, e-commerce, public administration, health records, national security systems, and global communications.

The major concern is that quantum computers could eventually break widely used public-key algorithms such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. These algorithms are secure today because classical computers cannot efficiently solve the mathematical problems behind them at the required scale. However, quantum algorithms have changed how researchers think about long-term cryptographic security. Bernstein (2025) notes that post-quantum cryptography has emerged because conventional public-key cryptography may not remain safe in the presence of large-scale quantum computers. Mosca (2018) also argues that cybersecurity planning must begin before quantum computers become fully capable of breaking current systems because cryptographic migration takes many years.

This creates a major challenge for organizations that rely on long-term data protection. Sensitive records such as health data, legal documents, government files, identity records, financial information, intellectual property, and

defense-related communications may need to remain confidential for decades. If such data is encrypted using algorithms that later become vulnerable, the protection offered today may not be sufficient in the future. Recent systematic reviews also show that quantum computing is increasingly discussed as a cybersecurity risk because it affects both technical defenses and long-term security governance (Barrett-Danes & Ahmad, 2025). Therefore, quantum computing should not be treated only as a future computing innovation. It should also be treated as a cybersecurity risk that requires early preparation.

1.2. Vulnerability of Current Public-Key Cryptography

The vulnerability of current public-key cryptography is mainly linked to the mathematical problems on which these systems depend. RSA depends on the difficulty of factoring large integers, while Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptography depend on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problems. These problems are extremely difficult for classical computers when properly sized parameters are used. This is why RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC have been widely adopted across internet security, digital certificates, secure messaging, software signing, and enterprise authentication systems.

Shor's algorithm changed the long-term security outlook for these systems. Shor (1994) demonstrated that a quantum computer could solve integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems efficiently. This means that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could undermine the security assumptions behind RSA and Diffie-Hellman. Proos and Zalka (2003) further showed that elliptic curve discrete logarithms are also vulnerable to quantum computation. This is particularly important because ECC is widely used in modern systems due to its efficiency and smaller key sizes compared with RSA. The risk is therefore not limited to older cryptographic systems. It also affects many modern protocols and identity systems that depend on elliptic curve methods.

Grover's algorithm introduces a different type of concern. Grover (1996) showed that quantum search can speed up brute-force attacks. This has implications for symmetric encryption and hash functions. However, its effect is generally less severe than Shor's algorithm against public-key cryptography. In many cases, symmetric cryptography can respond by increasing key sizes. For example, a system that requires stronger protection may move toward larger symmetric keys to compensate for the quantum speedup. Li et al. (2023) explain that quantum threats affect different cryptographic mechanisms in different ways, which means the response must be carefully matched to the type of cryptographic system being protected.

The practical implication is clear. Public-key cryptographic systems face the most urgent long-term risk because their mathematical foundations could be directly broken by future quantum computers. Symmetric-key systems and hash functions also require attention, but they are not weakened in the same immediate way. This distinction matters because post-quantum readiness should prioritize the systems most exposed to quantum disruption, especially systems that use RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC for key exchange, authentication, certificates, and digital signatures.

Post-quantum cryptography readiness matters because cryptographic migration is slow, complex, and deeply connected to enterprise infrastructure. Organizations cannot simply replace one algorithm with another overnight. Cryptography is often embedded in applications, operating systems, web servers, databases, APIs, cloud platforms, mobile applications, authentication systems, certificates, IoT devices, payment platforms, vendor tools, and third-party services. In many cases, organizations do not have a complete record of where cryptography is used. This makes migration difficult because security teams must first identify vulnerable cryptographic assets before they can decide what needs to be replaced.

Mosca (2018) argues that organizations must think about quantum risk in terms of time. If the time required to migrate systems plus the required confidentiality lifetime of data is longer than the time before quantum computers become capable of breaking current cryptography, then the organization is already exposed. This is why post-quantum readiness is not only a technical issue. It is also a planning, governance, and risk management issue. Campbell (2025) similarly emphasizes that enterprise migration to post-quantum cryptography requires a structured timeline, strategic planning, and organizational coordination.

Another reason readiness matters is the problem of crypto-agility. Crypto-agility refers to the ability of a system to change or upgrade cryptographic algorithms without requiring a complete redesign. Many existing systems were not built with this flexibility. Some use hardcoded algorithms, outdated libraries, or vendor-managed cryptographic components that cannot be easily replaced. Ott and Peikert (2019) identify cryptographic agility as a major research and migration challenge because organizations need systems that can adapt to changing standards and future vulnerabilities.

Current guidance also shows that migration is already becoming a practical cybersecurity priority. The National Institute of Standards and Technology released finalized post-quantum encryption standards in 2024, while the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence has continued to support migration planning through its work on post-quantum cryptography readiness (NIST, 2024; NCCoE, 2025). These developments show that post-quantum migration is no longer only a theoretical research concern. It is becoming a real cybersecurity planning requirement for organizations that manage sensitive information systems.

1.3. Aim and Scope of the Article

This article examines post-quantum cryptography readiness from a cybersecurity strategy perspective. Its main aim is to explain why quantum computing creates long-term

risks for current cryptographic systems and how organizations can prepare for the transition to quantum-safe security. The article does not treat post-quantum cryptography only as a mathematical or algorithmic subject. Instead, it connects the technical foundations of post-quantum cryptography with enterprise risk management, information systems security, migration planning, and organizational readiness.

The scope of the article includes five main areas. First, it discusses quantum-era threats and explains how Shor's and Grover's algorithms affect current cryptographic systems. Second, it reviews the main post-quantum cryptographic algorithm families and their cybersecurity relevance. Third, it considers current standardization efforts, especially the role of NIST in moving post-quantum cryptography toward practical adoption. Fourth, it examines migration barriers faced by enterprises, including cryptographic asset discovery, legacy infrastructure, vendor dependency, interoperability, performance concerns, and governance gaps. Finally, it proposes a practical readiness framework that organizations can use to prepare for post-quantum migration.

The article draws on research concerning post-quantum algorithm performance, implementation challenges, standardization, and enterprise migration. Kumar (2022) provides useful insight into post-quantum algorithm standardization and performance analysis, while Dam et al. (2023) and Li et al. (2023) highlight broader opportunities and challenges in the post-quantum landscape. In addition, NIST's post-quantum cryptography project provides an official basis for understanding current standards and migration direction (NIST Computer Security Resource Center, 2024). Together, these sources support a cybersecurity-focused discussion of how organizations can prepare for the quantum computing era.

2. Conceptual Background: Quantum Threats and Post-Quantum Cryptography

2.1. Quantum Computing and the Cryptographic Threat Landscape

The relationship between quantum computing and cybersecurity is centered on the way cryptographic systems depend on computational difficulty. Most security protocols used today are not impossible to break in a mathematical sense. Instead, they are considered secure because breaking them would require an unrealistic amount of time and computing power using classical machines. Quantum computing changes this assumption for certain problem classes. If quantum computers become powerful and stable enough, they may be able to solve some cryptographic problems much faster than classical systems.

This issue is especially important because cryptography operates as a hidden foundation of digital trust. When users access online banking, sign documents digitally, connect to cloud platforms, send encrypted messages, or use secure websites, cryptographic protocols are working in the background. These protocols protect not only data confidentiality but also authentication and integrity. If the algorithms behind them are weakened, attackers may be able to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communication, forge digital signatures, or compromise trusted software updates.

The threat is not the same across all types of cryptography. Shor's algorithm is particularly dangerous for public-key systems because it directly affects the mathematical problems behind RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC (Shor, 1994; Proos & Zalka, 2003). Grover's algorithm affects symmetric-key cryptography and hash functions by reducing the difficulty of brute-force search, but this risk can often be managed by increasing key lengths (Grover, 1996; Li et al., 2023). This difference is important because post-quantum readiness must be risk-based. Organizations should first identify the systems most exposed to quantum attacks and then plan migration according to data sensitivity, system criticality, and operational complexity.

Post-quantum cryptography developed in response to this changing threat landscape. It focuses on cryptographic methods believed to resist both classical and quantum attacks while still being usable on current computing infrastructure. Bernstein (2025) describes post-quantum cryptography as a major response to the risk that quantum computers pose to conventional public-key systems. Mosca (2018) further stresses that organizations should not wait for quantum computers to become operationally threatening before they begin planning. By that point, migration may already be too late for systems that protect long-life sensitive data.

2.2. Shor's Algorithm and the Risk to RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC

Shor's algorithm is central to the discussion of quantum-era cybersecurity risk. It showed that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms efficiently (Shor, 1994). This is a major problem because RSA depends on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. Diffie-Hellman key exchange depends on the discrete logarithm problem. Elliptic curve cryptography depends on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. These assumptions are fundamental to many public-key systems used in modern digital communication.

The effect of Shor's algorithm is particularly serious because public-key cryptography is widely used for secure key exchange and digital signatures. In a typical secure communication process, public-key cryptography helps two parties establish shared secret keys or verify identity. If an attacker can break the public-key mechanism, the attacker may be able to compromise encrypted sessions, forge signatures, or impersonate trusted entities. This would affect secure websites, email security, virtual private networks, digital certificates, software distribution, financial transactions, and many enterprise security systems.

ECC deserves special attention because many organizations adopted it as a more efficient alternative to RSA. ECC can provide strong security with smaller key sizes, making it useful for mobile devices, embedded systems, IoT, and high-performance internet protocols.

However, Proos and Zalka (2003) showed that elliptic curve discrete logarithms are also vulnerable to quantum algorithms. This means ECC is not a safe long-term replacement for RSA in a quantum threat environment. Although ECC remains secure against current practical classical attacks when properly implemented, its future security is uncertain in the presence of large-scale quantum computers.

This does not mean that every public-key system will fail immediately. Large, fault-tolerant quantum computers capable of breaking real-world cryptographic keys are not yet widely available. The problem is that cryptographic systems are deployed for long periods, and migration across complex information systems takes time. As Mosca (2018) explains, cybersecurity planning must account for the time needed to transition systems and the length of time that protected data must remain confidential. Therefore, Shor's algorithm matters not only because of what it may enable in the future, but also because it changes what responsible long-term cybersecurity planning should look like today.

2.3. Grover's Algorithm and Symmetric-Key Security

Grover's algorithm presents a different kind of quantum risk. It provides a quadratic speedup for searching an unsorted database, which has implications for brute-force attacks against symmetric-key cryptography and hash functions (Grover, 1996). In simple terms, a quantum attacker may need fewer operations to search through possible keys than a classical attacker. This weakens the effective security level of symmetric keys, although it does not break symmetric cryptography in the same direct way that Shor's algorithm threatens RSA and ECC.

The practical response to Grover's algorithm is often more manageable. Symmetric-key systems can usually increase key sizes to maintain an acceptable security level. For example, if quantum search reduces the effective strength of a key, using a larger key can help restore the intended security margin. This is why the quantum risk to symmetric encryption is serious but generally less disruptive than the risk to public-key cryptography. Public-key algorithms based on factoring and discrete logarithms require replacement, while many symmetric systems may require parameter strengthening and careful review.

Hash functions also need consideration because Grover's algorithm may affect preimage resistance. However, as with symmetric encryption, the response can often involve using stronger hash functions or longer output lengths. Li et al. (2023) explain that post-quantum security requires attention to multiple cryptographic components, including symmetric encryption, hash functions, key exchange, and signatures. This means organizations should not focus only on replacing RSA or ECC. They should also review the broader cryptographic environment to ensure that all security controls remain appropriate in a quantum-aware setting.

The distinction between Shor's and Grover's algorithms helps shape migration priorities. Systems using RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC for public-key operations should be treated as high-priority migration targets because they face direct exposure to future quantum attacks. Symmetric encryption and hash-based mechanisms should also be reviewed, but their path to quantum resistance is often less disruptive. A careful readiness strategy should therefore classify cryptographic assets according to the type of algorithm used, the sensitivity of the data protected, the expected lifetime of the data, and the difficulty of migration.

2.4. Harvest Now, Decrypt Later Threat Model

One of the most important reasons for early post-quantum readiness is the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat model. Under this model, an adversary collects encrypted data today and stores it until future quantum computers become capable of decrypting it. The attacker does not need to break the encryption immediately. The goal is to preserve the data until the technology needed to decrypt it becomes available. This makes the threat especially serious for information that must remain confidential for many years.

This risk applies strongly to sectors that manage long-life sensitive data. Healthcare systems store patient records, genomic information, insurance details, and clinical histories that may remain sensitive for decades. Governments store classified records, identity information, diplomatic communication, and national security data. Financial institutions hold transaction records, customer identity data, credit information, and investment records. Enterprises also manage intellectual property, legal documents, research files, trade secrets, and strategic business information. If such data is captured today under vulnerable cryptographic protection, it may become exposed in the future when quantum capabilities improve.

Mosca (2018) presents this timing problem as a central concern in quantum cybersecurity readiness. If data must remain confidential for a long time, and migration also takes a long time, waiting until quantum attacks become practical is not a safe strategy. Barrett-Danes and Ahmad (2025) also highlight the growing concern around emerging quantum threats and the need for post-quantum solutions. Campbell (2025) adds that enterprise migration requires strategic planning because organizations must identify vulnerable systems, prioritize assets, coordinate vendors, and test new implementations. The NCCoE (2025) similarly emphasizes the importance of preparing for migration through practical discovery and planning activities.



Figure 1. Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) Threat Model

2.5. Meaning of Post-Quantum Cryptograph

Post-quantum cryptography refers to cryptographic algorithms designed to remain secure against both classical and quantum attacks while running on conventional computing systems. This is an important point because post-quantum cryptography does not require organizations to use quantum computers. Instead, it provides quantum-resistant algorithms that can be implemented on today's hardware, software, applications, protocols, and networks.

Post-quantum cryptography is mainly concerned with replacing or strengthening cryptographic mechanisms that may become vulnerable to quantum attacks. This includes key exchange, digital signatures, authentication, certificate systems, secure communication protocols, and software verification. Bernstein (2025) explains that the goal of post-quantum cryptography is to prepare cryptographic systems for a future in which quantum computers may be able to defeat widely used public-key algorithms. Kumar (2022) also discusses post-quantum cryptography in the context of standardization and performance, showing that algorithm selection must consider both security and practical deployment.

Several algorithm families are commonly discussed in post-quantum cryptography. These include lattice-based cryptography, hash-based signatures, code-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, and other mathematical constructions. Dam et al. (2023) describe post-quantum cryptography as a growing research field shaped by the need to identify secure, efficient, and deployable alternatives to vulnerable public-key systems. Li et al. (2023) further note that post-quantum security creates both opportunities and challenges because new algorithms must be secure, efficient, interoperable, and practical for real-world systems.

For organizations, the meaning of post-quantum cryptography extends beyond algorithm design. It includes readiness planning, system discovery, vendor management, testing, procurement, policy updates, and long-term governance. A technically strong algorithm will not protect an organization if it is not implemented correctly, integrated with existing systems, and supported by operational processes. This is why post-quantum cryptography should be understood as both a cryptographic discipline and a cybersecurity management priority.

2.6. Difference Between Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Cryptography

Post-quantum cryptography and quantum cryptography are sometimes confused, but they refer to different approaches. Post-quantum cryptography focuses on algorithms that can resist attacks from quantum computers while operating on classical computing systems. These algorithms are intended to replace or supplement vulnerable public-key systems in existing digital infrastructure. In practical terms, post-quantum cryptography is the more immediate migration path for most organizations because it can be implemented through software, protocols, certificates, and security products.Quantum cryptography, by contrast, usually refers to security methods that use principles of quantum physics. The most common example is quantum key distribution, which uses quantum properties to support secure key exchange. Quantum cryptography may offer important security benefits in specific settings, but it often requires specialized hardware, communication channels, and infrastructure. This makes it different from post-quantum cryptography, which is designed for broader deployment across classical networks and information systems.

This distinction matters because organizations need a clear understanding of what they are preparing to adopt. When cybersecurity teams discuss post-quantum migration, they are usually referring to replacing vulnerable algorithms such as RSA and ECC with quantum-resistant alternatives that can run on current systems. They are not necessarily referring to the deployment of quantum communication hardware. Bernstein (2025) and Dam et al. (2023) both emphasize the role of post-quantum cryptography as a practical response to quantum threats within conventional computing environments.

Clear terminology also helps prevent poor planning. If an organization assumes that quantum-safe security requires quantum hardware, it may delay action unnecessarily. In reality, much of the current readiness effort focuses on cryptographic inventory, crypto-agility, standards-based

algorithm adoption, interoperability testing, and phased migration. Therefore, post-quantum cryptography should be viewed as a practical cybersecurity transition that can begin now, even before large-scale quantum computers become operational threats.

3. Literature Review and Current Research Direction

3.1. Growth of Post-Quantum Cryptography Research

Post-quantum cryptography has moved from a specialized area of cryptographic research into a major cybersecurity concern for governments, enterprises, cloud providers, and information systems managers. The growth of this field is closely linked to the increasing awareness that future quantum computers may be capable of weakening or breaking public-key cryptographic systems that are widely used today. Although practical large-scale quantum attacks are not yet common, the long-term risk has become difficult to ignore because many organizations store sensitive data that must remain confidential for many years. This has made post-quantum cryptography a forward-looking security priority rather than a purely theoretical research topic.

Recent bibliometric and scientometric studies show that research output on post-quantum cryptography has expanded significantly in response to two major pressures. The first is the technical threat posed by quantum algorithms to classical public-key cryptography. The second is the growing influence of standardization efforts, especially those led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Hanafi and Ali (2025) show that post-quantum cryptography has become a fast-developing research area, with increasing attention to algorithm design, implementation efficiency, security evaluation, and migration planning. Similarly, Hasija et al. (2025) observe that the field has grown beyond theoretical cryptography into broader areas such as cybersecurity policy, enterprise readiness, cloud security, IoT protection, and digital infrastructure resilience.

This research growth is important because post-quantum migration cannot be handled as a simple technical upgrade. Cryptographic systems are deeply embedded in communication protocols, digital certificates, authentication systems, software libraries, databases, cloud services, payment systems, and connected devices. As a result, current research increasingly focuses on how organizations can move from awareness to practical implementation. The literature now reflects a shift from asking whether post-quantum cryptography is necessary to asking how it can be deployed safely, efficiently, and at scale.

3.2. Survey Evidence on PQC Opportunities and Challenges

Survey studies provide a useful foundation for understanding the opportunities and challenges of post-quantum cryptography. Kumar (2022) explains that the NIST standardization process has helped organize the field by evaluating candidate algorithms according to security strength, performance, implementation feasibility, and practical deployment potential. This standardization effort is important because organizations need trusted guidance before making major changes to security systems that support critical operations.

Dam et al. (2023) describe post-quantum cryptography as the beginning of a new race in cybersecurity. Their survey shows that several algorithm families are being considered for quantum-resistant security, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography. However, the literature also makes clear that not all algorithm families are equally mature or equally suitable for broad deployment. Some approaches offer strong performance but require careful parameter selection, while others have conservative security foundations but introduce larger keys, larger signatures, or slower operations.

Li et al. (2023) emphasize that post-quantum security creates both opportunities and operational challenges. On the opportunity side, post-quantum cryptography offers a practical path for protecting classical information systems against future quantum threats without requiring organizations to deploy quantum hardware. On the challenge side, implementation remains complex. Algorithms must be evaluated not only for mathematical security but also for memory use, bandwidth consumption, processing cost, side-channel resistance, and interoperability with existing protocols.

Implementation concerns are especially important in lattice-based cryptography, which is one of the leading directions in post-quantum research. Nejatollahi et al. (2019) show that lattice-based schemes are promising because of their efficiency and strong theoretical foundations, but their real-world deployment requires careful attention to hardware design, software performance, implementation security, and resistance to physical attacks. This shows that post-quantum readiness is not only about selecting an algorithm. It also requires careful engineering, testing, and governance.

3.3. Post-Quantum Cryptography in Enterprise Cybersecurity

The literature on post-quantum cryptography has increasingly moved from mathematical design toward enterprise cybersecurity readiness. Earlier discussions often focused on whether certain algorithms could resist quantum attacks. More recent work asks how organizations can discover where cryptography is used, assess which systems are exposed, prioritize migration, coordinate with vendors, and maintain operational continuity during the transition.

Campbell (2025) argues that enterprise migration to post-quantum cryptography requires timeline analysis and strategic planning because large organizations cannot replace cryptographic systems quickly. Cryptography is often hidden inside applications, APIs, security appliances, certificates, identity systems, VPNs, cloud services, and third-party platforms. This makes migration difficult because many organizations do not have a complete inventory of their cryptographic assets. Without such an inventory, security teams may not know which systems depend on RSA, elliptic

curve cryptography, Diffie-Hellman, or other algorithms that may become vulnerable in the quantum era.

Ott and Peikert (2019) highlight cryptographic agility as a central requirement for post-quantum migration. Crypto-agility refers to the ability of an organization to replace, update, or reconfigure cryptographic mechanisms without redesigning entire systems. This capability is essential because post-quantum standards, implementation practices, and security recommendations may continue to evolve. An organization that lacks crypto-agility may face major disruption whenever a cryptographic algorithm needs to be replaced.

Official migration guidance also reinforces the need for enterprise-level planning. The NCCoE (2025) emphasizes cryptographic discovery, dependency mapping, risk prioritization, and migration planning as core steps in post-quantum readiness. This aligns with the broader literature, which treats post-quantum migration as an information systems management issue. The challenge is not only to understand quantum-resistant algorithms but to manage change across complex digital environments involving people, processes, vendors, infrastructure, and governance.

3.4. Post-Quantum Cryptography for IoT and Resource-Constrained Systems

Post-quantum cryptography creates special challenges for IoT systems and other resource-constrained environments. Unlike conventional enterprise servers, IoT devices often have limited processing power, memory, battery capacity, and bandwidth. Many also remain in use for long periods, sometimes without regular software updates. This makes post-quantum migration difficult because algorithms that work well in cloud or enterprise environments may not perform efficiently on constrained devices.

Fernández-Caramés (2019) explains that IoT security must prepare for the transition from pre-quantum to post-quantum protection because connected devices increasingly support healthcare systems, transportation networks, smart cities, energy infrastructure, industrial control systems, and consumer electronics. These systems often depend on lightweight cryptographic protocols, and the introduction of larger post-quantum keys or signatures may affect performance and usability.

Lohachab et al. (2020) also show that securing post-quantum IoT networks requires attention to communication efficiency, authentication, key exchange, and device constraints. Their work is important because IoT systems are not isolated devices. They form networks of sensors, gateways, cloud services, and applications, meaning that weaknesses in one layer may affect the security of the whole system. Asif (2021) further notes that lattice-based algorithms may be promising for IoT environments, but practical deployment must consider resource limitations and implementation complexity.

Recent studies continue to expand this discussion. Zhang et al. (2024) examine post-quantum secure identity-based signatures for IoT networks, showing how quantum-resistant approaches can support authentication in connected environments. Khan et al. (2025) focus on implementation and performance in resource-constrained consumer electronics, while Adere et al. (2026) identify emerging threats, countermeasures, and research needs for securing IoT systems with post-quantum cryptography. Together, these studies show that post-quantum readiness must include constrained environments, not only high-capacity enterprise systems.

4. Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards and Algorithm Families

4.1. NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process

The NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process has become one of the most important reference points for quantum-safe cybersecurity planning. Its purpose is to identify and standardize cryptographic algorithms that can resist attacks from both classical and quantum computers. This process has given organizations a clearer basis for planning migration because it separates well-evaluated candidates from less mature proposals.

In 2024, NIST released finalized post-quantum encryption standards, marking a major turning point in the transition toward quantum-safe cryptography (NIST, 2024a). These standards include ML-KEM for key encapsulation, which is based on CRYSTALS-Kyber, and post-quantum digital signature standards such as ML-DSA and SLH-DSA. The NIST Computer Security Resource Center continues to provide updates on the post-quantum cryptography project, including algorithm status, standardization materials, and implementation guidance (NIST Computer Security Resource Center, 2024). The Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard also provides a formal specification for ML-KEM, which is now central to enterprise post-quantum migration planning (NIST, 2024b).

The importance of NIST's work is not limited to algorithm selection. It also shapes procurement, compliance, vendor roadmaps, software development, and cybersecurity governance. Organizations are more likely to adopt post-quantum algorithms when they are supported by recognized standards because standardization reduces uncertainty and encourages interoperability across products and platforms.

4.2. Key Encapsulation Mechanisms

Key encapsulation mechanisms are central to secure communication because they allow two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. In modern cybersecurity, this function is essential for protocols such as TLS, secure messaging, VPNs, cloud access, and other encrypted communications. Since many current key exchange systems rely on RSA, Diffie-Hellman, or elliptic curve methods, they may become vulnerable to sufficiently powerful quantum computers.

CRYSTALS-Kyber is one of the most influential post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms. Bos et al. (2018) describe Kyber as a module-lattice-based KEM designed to provide strong security with practical performance. Its importance increased further when it became the basis for NIST's ML-KEM standard. This makes it one of the most relevant algorithms for organizations preparing for quantum-safe key exchange.

From a cybersecurity readiness perspective, ML-KEM is important because key exchange is found across many enterprise systems. If organizations do not migrate vulnerable key establishment mechanisms, encrypted sessions, APIs, cloud services, and remote access systems may remain exposed to future quantum risk. However, adoption still requires testing. Security teams must examine how post-quantum KEMs affect certificate handling, handshake size, latency, interoperability, and compatibility with existing systems.

4.3. Digital Signature Algorithms

Digital signatures are another critical part of cybersecurity. They support authentication, software integrity, digital certificates, secure transactions, code signing, identity management, and trusted communication. If quantum computers weaken current digital signature systems, attackers may be able to forge signatures, impersonate trusted entities, compromise software updates, or undermine certificate-based trust systems.

Several post-quantum signature schemes have received major attention in the literature. Ducas et al. (2018) present CRYSTALS-Dilithium, a lattice-based digital signature scheme that later became closely associated with NIST's ML-DSA standard. Dilithium is important because it offers a practical balance between security and efficiency, making it suitable for many enterprise use cases. Falcon is another lattice-based signature scheme, designed to provide compact signatures based on NTRU structures (Fouque et al., 2018). Its compactness makes it attractive, although implementation complexity must be carefully considered.

Hash-based signatures also remain important because they are built on conservative cryptographic assumptions. Bernstein et al. (2015) introduced SPHINCS as a practical stateless hash-based signature scheme, while Hülsing (2013) contributed W-OTS+, which supports shorter hash-based signatures. These works are relevant because hash-based signatures are often viewed as reliable alternatives where long-term security assurance is a priority. However, they may involve trade-offs in signature size and performance.

4.4. Lattice-Based Cryptography

Lattice-based cryptography is one of the strongest and most active directions in post-quantum research. It is widely studied because it supports several useful cryptographic functions, including encryption, key encapsulation, and digital signatures. Many leading post-quantum schemes are based on lattice problems, and this has made lattice-based cryptography central to current standardization and implementation efforts.

The theoretical foundation of lattice-based cryptography is supported by work on the learning with errors problem and related lattice assumptions. Regev (2009) established important connections between lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptographic construction. Lyubashevsky et al. (2010) later examined ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings, which helped support more efficient lattice-based schemes. Hoffstein et al. (1998) introduced NTRU as a ring-based public-key cryptosystem, which remains influential in later post-quantum cryptographic designs.

The attraction of lattice-based cryptography lies in its combination of strong security assumptions and practical efficiency. Nejatollahi et al. (2019) show that lattice-based cryptography has received major attention for both software and hardware implementation. However, deployment still requires caution. Side-channel resistance, parameter selection, memory use, and implementation correctness are all important concerns. This is why lattice-based cryptography should be treated as a promising but carefully managed part of the post-quantum transition.

4.5. Code-Based and Hash-Based Cryptography

Code-based and hash-based cryptography also play important roles in the post-quantum landscape. Code-based cryptography has a long research history and is based on the hardness of decoding problems. Niederreiter (1986) contributed to early code-based cryptographic systems through work on knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory. Code-based schemes are often valued for their long-standing security foundations, although large public key sizes may limit their use in some environments.

Hash-based signatures are also significant because they rely on the security of hash functions rather than number-theoretic assumptions that are directly threatened by Shor's algorithm. Bernstein et al. (2015) and Hülsing (2013) show how hash-based signatures can support post-quantum authentication and digital signing. Their conservative security basis makes them attractive for high-assurance systems, but their performance and signature sizes must be considered in real deployments.

These algorithm families show that post-quantum cryptography is not a single technology. It is a collection of approaches with different strengths, weaknesses, and deployment profiles. For this reason, organizations should avoid treating PQC as a one-size-fits-all solution. Algorithm choice should depend on the specific use case, system constraints, data sensitivity, standardization status, and interoperability requirements.

4.6. Algorithm Selection Considerations

Selecting a post-quantum algorithm requires more than choosing the mathematically strongest candidate. In practice, cybersecurity teams must evaluate how each algorithm

performs within real systems. Important factors include security level, implementation maturity, key size, signature size, bandwidth demand, memory use, processing overhead, compatibility with protocols, and vendor support.

Survey literature shows that algorithm performance and implementation complexity are major concerns in PQC adoption (Kumar, 2022; Dam et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023). Lattice-based schemes are often attractive because of their balance between performance and security, but they still require careful implementation. Hash-based signatures offer conservative security but may introduce larger signatures. Code-based approaches have a long security history but may involve very large public keys.

Performance studies in TLS environments also show that protocol integration must be tested before deployment. Paquin et al. (2020) demonstrate the importance of benchmarking post-quantum cryptography in TLS, while Astrizi and Custódio (2024) discuss hybrid approaches for transitioning to post-quantum TLS 1.3. These studies show that post-quantum migration must be validated in realistic environments, especially where latency, bandwidth, and interoperability are important.

Table 1. Main Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Families and Their Cybersecurity Relevance

Algorithm Family	Main Use	Cybersecurity Relevance	Key Consideration	Supporting Sources
Lattice-based cryptography	Key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signatures	Strong candidate for enterprise migration and standardized deployment	Key size, implementation security, side-channel resistance, and parameter selection	Nejatollahi et al. (2019); Bos et al. (2018); Ducas et al. (2018); Regev (2009); Lyubashevsky et al. (2010)
Hash-based signatures	Digital signatures	Conservative option for long-term signature security	Signature size, signing performance, and verification efficiency	Bernstein et al. (2015); Hülsing (2013)
Code-based cryptography	Encryption and key establishment	Long-standing foundation for quantum-resistant security	Large public keys and deployment practicality	Niederreiter (1986)
NTRU-based schemes	Encryption and digital signatures	Efficient lattice-related direction for post-quantum design	Parameter selection, compactness, and secure implementation	Fouque et al. (2018); Hoffstein et al. (1998)

5. Cybersecurity Readiness Challenges in the Quantum Computing Era

5.1. Lack of Cryptographic Asset Inventory

One of the most serious barriers to post-quantum migration is the lack of cryptographic asset inventory. Many organizations do not have a complete record of where cryptography is used across their systems. Cryptographic functions may be embedded in web servers, TLS configurations, VPNs, APIs, databases, digital certificates, software libraries, authentication systems, embedded devices, cloud platforms, and third-party applications. In many cases, these dependencies are not visible to security teams until a migration or incident exposes them.

Campbell (2025) emphasizes that enterprise migration requires a clear understanding of cryptographic exposure before any meaningful transition can begin. Ott and Peikert (2019) make a similar point by linking post-quantum migration to cryptographic agility. Organizations cannot become crypto-agile if they do not know which cryptographic tools, protocols, and libraries are currently in use. The NCCoE (2025) also identifies cryptographic discovery as a critical step in the migration process.

The absence of a cryptographic inventory creates several risks. Vulnerable algorithms may remain hidden in legacy systems, certificates may be renewed using outdated methods, and third-party products may continue to rely on quantum-vulnerable protocols. This makes discovery and documentation a first-order cybersecurity task, not a minor administrative activity.

5.2. Legacy Infrastructure and Technical Debt

Legacy infrastructure is another major challenge in the transition to post-quantum cryptography. Many organizations still operate older systems that were not designed with crypto-agility in mind. Some systems use hardcoded cryptographic algorithms, outdated libraries, unsupported software, or hardware that cannot easily support new algorithms. These issues are especially common in industrial systems, embedded devices, medical equipment, consumer electronics, and long-life infrastructure.

Campbell (2025) notes that enterprise migration timelines must account for technical debt and operational risk. Replacing cryptography in a modern cloud-native application may be difficult, but replacing cryptography in a legacy industrial or embedded system can be far more complex. Khan et al. (2025) show that resource-constrained consumer electronics require careful performance evaluation before post-quantum algorithms can be deployed. Adere et al. (2026) also highlight the difficulty of securing IoT systems where devices may have limited update mechanisms and long operational lifecycles.

Legacy infrastructure creates a practical dilemma. Organizations may understand the need for post-quantum migration, but some systems may be too fragile, too costly, or too operationally critical to update quickly. This makes

phased planning essential. High-risk systems must be prioritized, while legacy environments require special strategies such as segmentation, compensating controls, vendor engagement, or eventual replacement.

5.3. Performance, Bandwidth, and Implementation Constraints

Post-quantum algorithms can introduce performance and communication overhead that must be considered before deployment. Some algorithms have larger public keys, larger ciphertexts, larger signatures, or higher memory requirements than classical algorithms. These factors may affect TLS handshakes, certificate chains, mobile applications, constrained networks, embedded devices, and cloud services handling large volumes of secure connections.

Nejatollahi et al. (2019) show that implementation efficiency is one of the central concerns in lattice-based cryptography. Fernández-Caramés (2019), Lohachab et al. (2020), and Asif (2021) also show that IoT environments face additional constraints because devices may have limited processing power, memory, and battery capacity. These constraints may make some algorithms unsuitable for certain use cases unless optimized implementations are available.

Performance challenges also appear in network protocols. Paquin et al. (2020) show that benchmarking post-quantum cryptography in TLS is necessary because real-world performance depends on network conditions, protocol design, and algorithm choice. Astrizi and Custódio (2024) also discuss the transition to post-quantum TLS 1.3, showing that hybrid approaches may help migration but can introduce additional complexity.

5.4. Vendor, Cloud, and Supply Chain Dependency

Post-quantum migration will not be fully controlled by internal security teams. Many organizations depend on vendors, cloud providers, certificate authorities, hardware manufacturers, managed security service providers, and software suppliers. This means that even a well-prepared organization may be limited by the readiness of its external partners.

Campbell (2025) identifies vendor coordination as a major part of enterprise migration planning. Chang and Khan (2026) also show that networking protocols face challenges that require broad ecosystem coordination, not isolated organizational decisions. The NCCoE (2025) similarly emphasizes that migration involves complex dependencies across software, hardware, services, and operational environments.

This dependency creates procurement and governance implications. Organizations should ask vendors whether their products support crypto-agility, whether they have PQC migration roadmaps, and whether they can provide visibility into cryptographic dependencies. Cloud and managed service providers should also be assessed for quantum-safe readiness because many organizations rely on them for identity management, key management, secure communication, and data protection.

5.5. Governance and Skills Gap

Post-quantum cryptography is often discussed as a technical issue, but migration also depends on governance, leadership awareness, and workforce capability. Security teams must understand quantum-era risks, but executives must also support funding, planning, procurement changes, and long-term migration. Without governance support, PQC readiness may remain an isolated technical concern rather than an organizational security priority.

Mosca (2018) argues that organizations need to assess whether they will be ready before quantum threats become practical. Campbell (2025) extends this concern by framing enterprise migration as a strategic process that requires planning, timelines, and organizational coordination. Ott and Peikert (2019) also show that cryptographic agility requires deliberate design choices, not last-minute reaction.

The skills gap is also important. Many cybersecurity professionals are familiar with common encryption protocols, but fewer have practical experience with post-quantum algorithms, cryptographic inventory, or migration testing. Organizations therefore need training, policy updates, and collaboration between security architects, developers, infrastructure teams, procurement officers, compliance teams, and vendors.

5.6. Hybrid Cryptography and Interoperability Challenges

Hybrid cryptography is often discussed as a transitional approach for post-quantum migration. In a hybrid model, a system may combine classical cryptographic methods with post-quantum mechanisms to preserve compatibility while introducing quantum-resistant protection. This can be useful during the transition period because it allows organizations to test PQC without immediately abandoning existing infrastructure.

However, hybrid deployment is not simple. Paquin et al. (2020) show that post-quantum TLS must be benchmarked carefully because algorithm choices can affect performance and handshake behavior. Astrizi and Custódio (2024) discuss hybrid approaches in TLS 1.3, while Stebila et al. (2026) address hybrid key exchange design in TLS 1.3. These works show that hybrid cryptography can support migration, but it also creates new design and implementation questions.

Interoperability is one of the biggest concerns. Systems must communicate across different vendors, certificates, clients, servers, and protocols. If hybrid cryptography is not implemented consistently, it may create compatibility failures, configuration errors, or operational delays. For this reason, hybrid cryptography should be treated as a managed transition strategy rather than a simple plug-in solution.

6. Cybersecurity Strategies for Post-Quantum Readiness

6.1. Establish a Quantum-Readiness Roadmap

Organizations should begin post-quantum preparation by developing a structured quantum-readiness roadmap. This roadmap should define the organization's current cryptographic exposure, identify high-risk systems, establish migration priorities, assign responsibilities, and create a phased timeline for implementation. The roadmap should also align with broader cybersecurity governance, risk management, procurement, compliance, and digital transformation plans.

Mosca (2018) stresses that readiness must begin before quantum computers become capable of large-scale cryptographic attacks. Campbell (2025) similarly argues that enterprise migration requires timeline analysis and strategic planning. The NCCoE (2025) reinforces this position by emphasizing discovery, planning, and practical migration guidance. A roadmap therefore helps move PQC readiness from general awareness to structured action.

A useful roadmap should include several stages: cryptographic discovery, risk classification, pilot testing, vendor engagement, implementation planning, phased deployment, and continuous monitoring. Without such a roadmap, organizations may respond too late or focus only on visible systems while overlooking hidden cryptographic dependencies.

6.2. Build and Maintain a Cryptographic Asset Inventory

A cryptographic asset inventory is the foundation of post-quantum readiness. It should identify where cryptographic algorithms, keys, certificates, libraries, protocols, and security controls are used across the organization. This includes web applications, databases, APIs, cloud services, authentication systems, endpoint tools, VPNs, IoT devices, embedded systems, and third-party platforms.

Campbell (2025) and Ott and Peikert (2019) both show that migration cannot be effective without understanding existing cryptographic dependencies. The NCCoE (2025) also treats cryptographic discovery as a central part of post-quantum migration. This inventory should not be a one-time document. It should be maintained as systems change, vendors update products, certificates are renewed, and new applications are deployed.

A good inventory should capture the algorithm used, system owner, data type protected, certificate details, protocol version, vendor dependency, business criticality, and migration difficulty. This information allows security teams to prioritize the systems that need immediate attention and avoid wasting resources on low-risk assets.

6.3. Prioritize Long-Life and High-Sensitivity Data

Post-quantum migration should be risk-based. Organizations should first focus on systems that protect data with long confidentiality lifetimes. This is important because adversaries may collect encrypted data now and attempt to decrypt it in the future when quantum capabilities improve. Data that must remain private for many years is therefore more exposed to the harvest now, decrypt later threat model.

Mosca (2018) highlights the importance of planning around the time sensitivity of data protection. Barrett-Danes and Ahmad (2025) also discuss emerging quantum-related cybersecurity threats and research directions, including the risk to sensitive information. Campbell (2025) shows that enterprise migration should prioritize systems based on exposure, criticality, and long-term confidentiality requirements.

High-priority data may include healthcare records, genomic data, financial information, government records, intellectual property, defense information, legal records, identity data, and critical infrastructure documentation. These systems should be assessed early because their confidentiality value may extend beyond the expected timeline for quantum development.

6.4. Adopt Crypto-Agility

Crypto-agility is one of the most important principles for post-quantum readiness. It refers to the ability of an organization to replace or update cryptographic algorithms, protocols, keys, and libraries without redesigning entire systems. This is important because cryptographic recommendations can change over time. Algorithms may be updated, parameters may be revised, implementation weaknesses may be discovered, and standards may evolve.

Campbell (2025) identifies crypto-agility as a major part of enterprise migration strategy, while Ott and Peikert (2019) frame it as a key research and implementation challenge. The NCCoE (2025) also supports migration approaches that allow organizations to manage cryptographic change more effectively.

To adopt crypto-agility, organizations should avoid hardcoded algorithms, use configurable cryptographic libraries, maintain clear documentation, support automated certificate management, and include cryptographic flexibility in system design. Procurement policies should also require vendors to demonstrate support for algorithm updates and quantum-safe migration.

6.5. Test Post-Quantum Algorithms in Controlled Environments

Post-quantum algorithms should be tested before they are deployed widely. Pilot testing helps organizations understand performance, compatibility, interoperability, latency, certificate behavior, and resource use. This is especially important because PQC algorithms can have different key sizes, signature sizes, memory requirements, and network effects compared with classical cryptographic systems.

Nejatollahi et al. (2019) show that implementation security and performance are central issues in lattice-based

cryptography. Khan et al. (2025) demonstrate that resource-constrained consumer electronics require careful testing before PQC deployment. Paquin et al. (2020) also show that TLS benchmarking is necessary to understand how post-quantum algorithms behave in secure communication protocols. Astrizi and Custódio (2024) further support the need for controlled testing in post-quantum TLS transition.

Testing should begin in non-production environments. Security teams should evaluate whether applications function correctly, whether users experience performance problems, whether certificates remain manageable, and whether systems remain interoperable across vendors and platforms. Only after these issues are understood should organizations move toward phased deployment.

6.6. Engage Vendors and Third-Party Providers

Vendor engagement is essential because many cryptographic dependencies are outside direct organizational control. Software vendors, cloud providers, certificate authorities, hardware manufacturers, and managed service providers all play a role in post-quantum migration. If these providers are not ready, internal readiness efforts may be delayed.

Campbell (2025) emphasizes that enterprise migration requires coordination with external parties. Chang and Khan (2026) also show that networking protocol migration depends on broader ecosystem alignment. The NCCoE (2025) supports a practical migration approach that includes awareness of product dependencies and vendor-managed systems.

Organizations should ask vendors whether their products currently use quantum-vulnerable cryptography, whether they support crypto-agility, whether they have a post-quantum roadmap, and whether they plan to support NIST-standardized algorithms. Vendor readiness should also be included in procurement, contract renewal, risk assessment, and third-party security review processes.

6.7. Use Hybrid Cryptographic Approaches During Transition

Hybrid cryptographic approaches may help organizations transition from classical cryptography to post-quantum cryptography while maintaining compatibility with existing systems. In a hybrid model, classical and post-quantum algorithms are combined so that security does not rely on only one mechanism during the transition period.

Paquin et al. (2020) show that post-quantum TLS requires careful benchmarking, while Astrizi and Custódio (2024) examine a hybrid approach for transitioning to post-quantum TLS 1.3. Stebila et al. (2026) also discuss hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3, showing that hybrid approaches are becoming important in protocol-level migration planning.

Hybrid cryptography should not be treated as a final solution in every case. It is best understood as a transition strategy that allows organizations to test PQC, maintain interoperability, and reduce migration risk. Its deployment should be guided by standards, vendor support, and careful operational testing.

7. Proposed Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness Framework

7.1. Phase 1: Discovery and Cryptographic Inventory

The first phase of the proposed framework is discovery. Organizations must identify cryptographic assets across applications, networks, databases, APIs, certificates, cloud services, endpoint systems, IoT devices, authentication platforms, and third-party products. This phase creates the factual basis for all later decisions.

Campbell (2025), Ott and Peikert (2019), and the NCCoE (2025) all emphasize that migration planning depends on understanding where cryptography is used. Without discovery, organizations may overlook hidden dependencies or leave vulnerable systems unchanged. The output of this phase should be a cryptographic asset inventory that includes system ownership, algorithm type, protocol use, certificate details, vendor dependency, protected data type, and business criticality.

7.2. Phase 2: Risk Classification

After cryptographic assets have been identified, they should be classified according to risk. Not all systems require the same migration urgency. A public test system and a healthcare database containing long-life patient records should not be treated equally. Risk classification allows organizations to focus resources where quantum-related exposure is most serious.

The classification process should consider data sensitivity, data lifespan, exposure level, business importance, regulatory obligations, migration complexity, and dependency on external vendors. Mosca (2018) emphasizes the importance of readiness timelines, while Campbell (2025) connects enterprise migration to prioritization and strategic planning. The NCCoE (2025) also supports risk-based migration as part of practical PQC readiness.

7.3. Phase 3: Migration Planning

The third phase is migration planning. At this stage, organizations translate inventory and risk information into a practical roadmap. The plan should identify which systems will be migrated first, which systems require vendor support, which systems need replacement, and which systems can be protected through interim controls.

Campbell (2025) argues that enterprise migration requires timeline analysis and strategic frameworks. Chang and Khan (2026) show that networking protocol migration also requires careful coordination because post-quantum cryptography affects communication systems and interoperability. The NCCoE (2025) provides practical support for migration planning by focusing on real-world cryptographic discovery and transition issues.

A migration plan should include responsible teams, timelines, pilot environments, success criteria, rollback procedures, procurement requirements, and governance checkpoints. It should also be updated as standards, vendor capabilities, and organizational systems evolve.

7.4. Phase 4: Pilot Testing and Interoperability Validation

Pilot testing is necessary before broad deployment. In this phase, organizations test post-quantum algorithms and hybrid approaches in controlled environments. This may include TLS, certificates, APIs, authentication services, cloud workloads, VPNs, IoT gateways, and resource-constrained devices.

Khan et al. (2025) show that performance testing is especially important for constrained consumer electronics. Paquin et al. (2020) demonstrate the need for TLS benchmarking, while Astrizi and Custódio (2024) examine hybrid transition strategies in TLS 1.3. Stebila et al. (2026) further highlight the role of hybrid key exchange in post-quantum transition planning.

Pilot testing should evaluate latency, bandwidth, memory use, certificate handling, interoperability, user experience, error rates, and operational manageability. The goal is to identify problems before they affect production systems.

7.5. Phase 5: Phased Deployment

Once pilot testing is complete, organizations can begin phased deployment. Deployment should start with systems that have high risk, strong business justification, and manageable technical complexity. This may include externally exposed services, systems protecting long-life sensitive data, high-value identity platforms, and systems that already support crypto-agile configuration.

Campbell (2025) supports phased enterprise migration, while NIST's finalized standards provide a foundation for standardized deployment (NIST, 2024a; NIST, 2024b). Stebila et al. (2026) also show that protocol-level transition may involve hybrid approaches, especially in TLS environments. Phased deployment reduces operational risk because it allows organizations to learn from early implementation before expanding to more complex systems.

Deployment should include documentation, monitoring, fallback planning, staff training, and vendor coordination. It should also avoid rushed replacement of cryptographic systems without sufficient validation.

7.6. Phase 6: Governance, Monitoring, and Continuous Improvement

The final phase is governance and continuous improvement. Post-quantum readiness should not end after initial deployment. Organizations must continue monitoring standards, vendor updates, implementation risks, certificate practices, algorithm guidance, and emerging vulnerabilities. Cryptographic systems must be reviewed periodically because the post-quantum landscape will continue to evolve.

Mosca (2018) frames quantum readiness as a long-term cybersecurity concern. Campbell (2025) shows that enterprise migration requires strategic oversight, and the NIST Computer Security Resource Center (2024) continues to provide updates on standardization and algorithm status. The NCCoE (2025) also supports ongoing migration practices through practical guidance.

Governance should include executive oversight, policy updates, security training, procurement requirements, vendor reviews, and periodic cryptographic reassessment. This ensures that post-quantum security becomes part of normal cybersecurity management rather than a one-time technical project.



Figure 2. Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness Framework

Table 2. Phased Roadmap for Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration

Phase	Main Activity	Key Output
Phase 1	Cryptographic discovery	Cryptographic asset inventory
Phase 2	Risk classification	Priority migration list
Phase 3	Migration planning	Quantum-readiness roadmap
Phase 4	Pilot testing	Validated implementation model
Phase 5	Deployment	Quantum-safe implementation
Phase 6	Governance and monitoring	Continuous crypto-agility

8. Sector-Specific Implications of Post-Quantum Cryptography

8.1. Financial Services

The financial sector is one of the most exposed areas in the post-quantum transition because it depends heavily on public-key cryptography for transaction security, digital banking, customer authentication, payment processing, secure messaging, and regulatory reporting. Banks, insurance firms, payment processors, fintech platforms, and investment institutions all rely on cryptographic systems to protect high-value transactions and sensitive customer records. If quantum computers become capable of breaking widely used public-key algorithms, financial institutions could face risks involving account compromise, transaction manipulation, certificate abuse, and unauthorized access to long-term financial records.

The sector is also vulnerable because financial data has long-term value. Customer identity records, loan documents, tax information, investment data, and institutional transaction histories may remain sensitive for many years. This creates concern around the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat, where adversaries collect encrypted data today with the intention of decrypting it later when quantum capabilities improve (Mosca, 2018; Barrett-Danes & Ahmad, 2025). For this reason, financial organizations must treat post-quantum cryptography as a strategic risk management issue rather than a distant technical upgrade.

Post-quantum readiness in financial services should include cryptographic asset discovery, risk-based prioritization, vendor assessment, certificate management review, and pilot testing of quantum-safe mechanisms. Since financial institutions operate under strict regulatory and operational requirements, migration must be carefully phased to avoid disruption to payment systems, authentication infrastructure, and customer-facing platforms. Campbell (2025) emphasizes that enterprise migration to post-quantum cryptography requires structured timelines, strategic frameworks, and organizational coordination, which are especially important for highly regulated sectors such as finance.

8.2. Healthcare Systems

Healthcare systems face a different but equally serious post-quantum risk because health data often has a long confidentiality lifetime. Patient records, genomic data, insurance claims, prescription histories, diagnostic reports, and identity records can remain sensitive throughout a person's life. Unlike passwords or payment cards, medical information cannot simply be replaced once exposed. This makes healthcare a major target for future quantum-enabled data compromise, especially where encrypted records are stored, transmitted, or archived for long periods (Barrett-Danes & Ahmad, 2025).

The expansion of digital health has also increased the cryptographic burden on healthcare organizations. Hospitals, laboratories, insurers, telehealth providers, and public health agencies now depend on secure portals, cloud-based health records, remote monitoring platforms, connected medical devices, and medical IoT systems. Many of these systems use authentication, encryption, and digital certificates to protect communication between patients, clinicians, devices, and health information networks. However, some healthcare systems still operate with legacy infrastructure, fragmented platforms, and limited cybersecurity budgets, making post-quantum migration more complex.

Medical IoT introduces additional challenges. Many connected devices have limited processing power, memory, and battery capacity, which can make it difficult to deploy some post-quantum algorithms without performance trade-offs. Research on post-quantum IoT security shows that lightweight implementation, algorithm efficiency, and long device lifecycles must be considered when designing quantum-resistant healthcare systems (Fernández-Caramés, 2019; Asif, 2021; Adere et al., 2026). Therefore, healthcare organizations should begin by identifying high-risk systems, protecting long-life patient data, and working with vendors to ensure that future medical devices and telehealth platforms support quantum-safe cryptographic updates.

8.3. Government and Defense

Government and defense systems have some of the strongest reasons to prepare early for post-quantum cryptography. These sectors handle classified information, national security communications, public identity systems, intelligence records, military data, diplomatic communication, and critical public records. Many of these records require confidentiality for decades, which makes them highly exposed to future decryption risks. Even if quantum attacks are not yet practical at scale, encrypted national security data captured today may become vulnerable in the future (Mosca, 2018; Barrett-Danes & Ahmad, 2025).

Post-quantum readiness is also important for public trust. Government systems support passports, digital identity, tax records, voting infrastructure, public service platforms, law enforcement databases, and citizen records. A weakness in the cryptographic foundations of these systems could affect national resilience, institutional credibility, and public-sector service continuity. For defense agencies, the risks are even broader because cryptographic systems are tied to secure communications, weapons platforms, logistics, command systems, satellite networks, and intelligence-sharing environments.

Official guidance from NIST and NCCoE shows that post-quantum migration is now a practical cybersecurity priority, not only a research concern. NIST's finalized post-quantum standards provide a foundation for quantum-safe implementation, while NCCoE's migration guidance supports cryptographic discovery and transition planning for organizations with complex infrastructures (NIST, 2024; NCCoE, 2025). Government and defense agencies should therefore lead in cryptographic inventory, risk classification, procurement reform, vendor compliance, and long-term migration planning.

8.4. Cloud and Enterprise Information Systems

Cloud and enterprise information systems are central to post-quantum readiness because modern organizations increasingly depend on distributed infrastructure, cloud platforms, APIs, enterprise identity services, software supply chains, and hybrid environments. Cryptography is embedded throughout these systems, including TLS connections, virtual private networks, authentication services, key management systems, databases, container platforms, code-signing tools, backup systems, and third-party integrations. The challenge is that many organizations do not have a full view of where cryptography exists across their information systems.

For enterprise environments, post-quantum migration is not simply a matter of replacing one algorithm with another. It requires mapping cryptographic dependencies across internal systems, cloud services, vendor products, and managed service providers. Campbell (2025) argues that enterprise migration must follow a strategic framework because cryptographic dependencies are often hidden across applications, protocols, infrastructure, and supply chains. This makes cryptographic asset inventory one of the first and most important steps in post-quantum readiness.

Cloud migration adds further complexity because many cryptographic controls are partly managed by external providers. Organizations must assess whether cloud vendors, certificate authorities, software vendors, and security platforms have credible post-quantum roadmaps. The rise of hybrid and multi-cloud environments also means that interoperability must be tested carefully before deployment. Work on post-quantum cryptography in networking protocols shows that migration will require protocol-level adaptation, compatibility testing, and coordination across infrastructure layers (Chang & Khan, 2026). As a result, enterprise readiness should combine technical testing with procurement policy, vendor governance, and crypto-agile system design.

8.5. IoT, Consumer Electronics, and Critical Infrastructure

IoT, consumer electronics, and critical infrastructure systems present some of the most difficult post-quantum migration challenges. These environments often include constrained devices, long deployment lifecycles, limited update mechanisms, and real-time operational requirements. Smart meters, industrial sensors, transportation systems, energy grids, manufacturing equipment, medical devices, smart home products, and connected vehicles may remain in use for many years after deployment. If their cryptographic mechanisms are not designed for future migration, they may become difficult or impossible to update.

Research on post-quantum IoT security highlights the need to balance quantum resistance with performance, energy consumption, memory use, and communication overhead (Fernández-Caramés, 2019; Lohachab et al., 2020; Asif, 2021). This is especially important because some post-quantum schemes require larger keys or signatures than traditional public-key systems. For small devices and low-bandwidth networks, these requirements may affect latency, storage, and battery life. Recent work on post-quantum cryptography in consumer electronics also confirms that implementation performance remains a practical concern for resource-constrained systems (Khan et al., 2025).

Critical infrastructure raises even higher stakes because failures may affect public safety, economic stability, and national resilience. Industrial control systems, power grids, water systems, transportation networks, and emergency communication systems cannot be migrated casually. They require careful testing, compatibility review, and phased deployment. Post-quantum migration in these environments should therefore begin with inventory, risk classification, vendor coordination, and pilot testing before any wide-scale deployment occurs.

9. Discussion

9.1. Strategic Importance of Early Readiness

Post-quantum readiness must begin before large-scale quantum computers become capable of breaking current public-key cryptography. The reason is simple: cryptographic migration takes time. Organizations must first identify where vulnerable algorithms are used, assess the sensitivity of protected data, coordinate with vendors, test new algorithms, update protocols, revise procurement requirements, and train security teams. In large enterprises and public-sector environments, this process can take years.

Early readiness is also necessary because of the “harvest now, decrypt later” risk. Sensitive encrypted data may already be targeted by adversaries who expect to decrypt it in the future. This is a serious concern for data with long confidentiality lifetimes, including medical records, financial records, intellectual property, government archives, identity data, and defense information (Mosca, 2018; Barrett-Danes & Ahmad, 2025). Waiting until quantum attacks are practical would leave organizations with little time to protect data that has already been collected.

The strategic value of early preparation is therefore not limited to technical security. It also supports regulatory resilience, business continuity, digital trust, and long-term information governance. Campbell (2025) notes that enterprise migration to post-quantum cryptography requires strategic planning and timeline analysis. This means that organizations should begin with readiness assessments even if full deployment is not immediate.

9.2. Balancing Security, Cost, and Operational Continuity

Post-quantum migration must balance security improvement with cost, performance, interoperability, and operational continuity. Some post-quantum algorithms may require larger keys, larger signatures, increased bandwidth, or higher processing demands than classical cryptographic systems. These factors can affect TLS performance, IoT communication, cloud services, authentication systems, and enterprise applications (Kumar, 2022; Li et al., 2023; Nejatollahi et al., 2019).

For this reason, organizations should avoid unplanned or rushed migration. A poorly tested transition could create system failures, compatibility problems, certificate errors,

performance degradation, or security misconfigurations. Post-quantum migration should be treated as a staged process involving controlled testing, performance benchmarking, interoperability validation, and gradual deployment. Studies on post-quantum cryptography in TLS show that performance and network behavior must be evaluated carefully before wide adoption (Paquin et al., 2020).

Cost is also a major factor. Organizations may need to update software libraries, replace hardware, renegotiate vendor contracts, retrain staff, revise compliance documentation, and redesign parts of their security architecture. The challenge is not only to become quantum-safe, but to do so without undermining existing business operations. A practical migration strategy should prioritize high-risk systems first, especially those protecting sensitive long-life data.

9.3. Integration with Existing Cybersecurity Frameworks

Post-quantum readiness should not be treated as a separate cybersecurity project. It should be integrated into existing security frameworks, including zero trust, identity and access management, cloud security, secure software development, risk management, vendor governance, and incident response. This integration is important because cryptography supports many parts of the modern security stack.

For example, zero trust architecture depends on strong identity verification, secure communication, device trust, and continuous authentication. If the cryptographic foundations behind these controls become vulnerable, the broader security model may weaken. Similarly, cloud security depends on encryption, key management, certificate management, secure APIs, and trusted software supply chains. These areas must be included in post-quantum readiness planning.

Enterprise migration also requires governance. Security teams need policies that define where cryptography is used, how algorithms are approved, how certificates are managed, how vendors are assessed, and how future cryptographic updates will be handled. Campbell (2025) and NCCoE (2025) both emphasize the importance of structured migration planning, cryptographic discovery, and coordinated implementation. This shows that post-quantum readiness belongs within enterprise risk management and information systems governance, not only within technical cryptography teams.

9.4. Practical Role of Hybrid Cryptography

Hybrid cryptography is likely to play an important role during the transition to post-quantum systems. In a hybrid approach, classical cryptographic methods are combined with post-quantum mechanisms to support security and compatibility during migration. This is especially relevant in TLS and network protocols, where organizations need to maintain interoperability while testing and adopting quantum-resistant algorithms.

The practical value of hybrid cryptography is that it allows organizations to introduce post-quantum protection without immediately abandoning existing infrastructure. It can help reduce migration risk while standards, implementations, and vendor ecosystems continue to mature. Research on post-quantum TLS has shown that hybrid approaches can support a smoother transition, although they must still be tested for performance, certificate handling, latency, and implementation complexity (Paquin et al., 2020; Astrizi & Custódio, 2024).

However, hybrid cryptography should not be seen as a permanent substitute for full post-quantum readiness. It is a transitional strategy. Organizations still need long-term plans for algorithm replacement, system redesign, certificate migration, vendor coordination, and policy updates. The IETF work on hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 reflects the importance of protocol-level transition planning as organizations move toward standardized post-quantum deployment (Stebila et al., 2026).

9.5. Future Research Direction

Future research should address the practical barriers that organizations face when moving from cryptographic theory to real-world deployment. One important area is automated cryptographic discovery. Many organizations do not know where vulnerable cryptography exists across applications, APIs, certificates, libraries, cloud services, and embedded systems. Better tools are needed to identify, classify, and monitor cryptographic assets at scale.

Another important research area is lightweight post-quantum cryptography for IoT and constrained systems. Devices with limited memory, power, and processing capacity may struggle with some post-quantum algorithms. Research should therefore continue to explore efficient implementations, lightweight parameter choices, and secure update mechanisms for long-life devices (Fernández-Caramés, 2019; Khan et al., 2025; Adere et al., 2026).

Implementation security also needs further study. Even strong algorithms can fail if they are poorly implemented or exposed to side-channel attacks. More research is needed on secure hardware implementation, side-channel resistance, protocol interoperability, migration cost modeling, and sector-specific readiness frameworks. Networking research is also important because post-quantum algorithms must operate reliably in TLS, VPNs, cloud environments, and large-scale enterprise protocols (Nejatollahi et al., 2019; Chang & Khan, 2026).

10. Recommendations

Organizations should begin post-quantum readiness with a full cryptographic asset inventory. This inventory should identify where cryptographic algorithms, keys, certificates, protocols, software libraries, and hardware security modules are used across enterprise systems. It should include internal applications, cloud platforms, APIs, databases, IoT devices, authentication services, vendor products, and managed

service environments (Campbell, 2025; Ott & Peikert, 2019; NCCoE, 2025).

The next step is to identify systems that use quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, especially RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography. These systems should be reviewed in relation to their exposure level, business importance, and the sensitivity of the data they protect. Shor's algorithm and related quantum research show why these cryptographic systems require long-term migration planning (Shor, 1994; Proos & Zalka, 2003; Mosca, 2018).

Organizations should prioritize systems that protect sensitive data with long confidentiality lifetimes. This includes government records, financial data, health records, identity information, intellectual property, legal documents, and critical infrastructure data. These systems are most exposed to the harvest now, decrypt later threat because their confidentiality may still matter when stronger quantum computers become available (Mosca, 2018; Barrett-Danes & Ahmad, 2025; Campbell, 2025).

A formal post-quantum migration roadmap should then be developed. This roadmap should define responsible teams, migration phases, high-priority systems, testing requirements, vendor dependencies, budget needs, and governance responsibilities. It should also align with existing cybersecurity programs instead of operating as a separate technical project (Campbell, 2025; NCCoE, 2025).

Crypto-agility should become a core requirement in new applications, platforms, and procurement processes. Systems should be designed so that cryptographic algorithms can be replaced or updated without major redesign. This will help organizations respond not only to quantum threats, but also to future cryptographic weaknesses, new standards, and changing regulatory requirements (Campbell, 2025; Ott & Peikert, 2019; NCCoE, 2025).

Before full deployment, organizations should test NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms in controlled pilot environments. Testing should examine security, interoperability, certificate management, system performance, latency, bandwidth, memory usage, and compatibility with existing applications. NIST's finalized post-quantum standards, including the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, provide an important foundation for this testing process (NIST, 2024; NIST, 2024).

Organizations should also assess the performance impact of post-quantum cryptography across TLS, cloud platforms, IoT systems, mobile devices, and constrained environments. This is important because implementation conditions differ across sectors and device types. Research on IoT, consumer electronics, and TLS shows that performance testing is necessary before broad deployment (Fernández-Caramés, 2019; Khan et al., 2025; Paquin et al., 2020; Astrizi & Custódio, 2024).

Vendor engagement should be treated as a formal part of post-quantum readiness. Organizations should ask cloud providers, software vendors, certificate authorities, hardware vendors, and managed service providers about their quantum-safe migration plans. Vendor roadmaps should be reviewed during procurement, contract renewal, and third-party risk assessments (Campbell, 2025; Chang & Khan, 2026; NCCoE, 2025).

Hybrid cryptographic approaches should be used where appropriate during the transition period. Hybrid approaches may help maintain compatibility while organizations test post-quantum algorithms and prepare for wider deployment. However, they should be supported by careful protocol testing and clear long-term migration plans (Paquin et al., 2020; Astrizi & Custódio, 2024; Stebila et al., 2026).

Finally, organizations should update cybersecurity governance, staff training, and risk management policies to include quantum-era threats. Security teams, system architects, procurement officers, compliance staff, and executives should understand the purpose of post-quantum migration and the risks of delaying readiness. This will help ensure that post-quantum cryptography becomes part of long-term digital resilience planning rather than a late-stage emergency response (Mosca, 2018; Campbell, 2025; NCCoE, 2025).

11. Conclusion

Post-quantum cryptography readiness is becoming an essential part of modern cybersecurity and information systems management. The issue is not limited to the future arrival of powerful quantum computers. It also concerns the data being protected today, especially sensitive information that may remain valuable for many years. The possibility that encrypted data can be captured now and decrypted later makes early preparation necessary for sectors such as finance, healthcare, government, defense, cloud services, IoT, and critical infrastructure.

The transition to post-quantum cryptography is not simply an algorithm replacement exercise. It requires a clear understanding of where cryptography is used, which systems are most vulnerable, what data requires long-term protection, and which vendors control important parts of the security environment. Effective readiness therefore depends on cryptographic discovery, risk prioritization, crypto-agility, vendor engagement, pilot testing, phased migration, and continuous governance (Mosca, 2018; Campbell, 2025; NCCoE, 2025).

NIST's finalized post-quantum standards provide an important foundation for migration, but standards alone will not make organizations quantum-safe. The real challenge is implementation across complex information systems, legacy infrastructure, cloud platforms, network protocols, and constrained devices (NIST, 2024; NIST, 2024). Organizations that begin preparing early will be better positioned to protect long-life data, maintain operational

continuity, and preserve digital trust in the quantum computing era.

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